

How to Defend the Phenomenology of Attitudes

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It is commonly held that there is something it feels like to be in pain or to have an itch. In other words, it is widely thought that sensations such as pains and itches possess phenomenology. It is much more controversial whether attitudes such as beliefs and desires have a felt quality to them. Some philosophers think it is obvious that, e.g. desiring a glass of wine, does not feel like anything.¹ Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that not only do some attitudes feel a certain way, but that these attitudes possess a non-sensory phenomenology.² Let's call the type of phenomenology these philosophers think exist, *non-sensory attitudinal phenomenology* (NSAP). In what follows my main objective will be to offer an argument in support of the view that NSAP exists. Such an argument is significant since, as I will contend, the most popular arguments in the literature offered in support of NSAP fail to get their proponents to the conclusion that such phenomenology exists.

My defense of the existence of NSAP will proceed as follows: in part 1, I offer a detailed characterization of NSAP, one that explains what non-sensory phenomenology amounts to, as well as what it means to say that an attitude *possesses* phenomenology. In part 2, I argue that the most popular arguments offered in defense of NSAP get

¹ Nelkin (1989) is one philosopher who thinks attitudes lack phenomenology. He writes, "There are propositional attitudes, and we are sometimes noninferentially conscious about our attitudinal states. But such consciousness does not feel like anything. A propositional attitude and consciousness about that attitude have no phenomenological properties" (430). See Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007; p. 468) for a similar claim.

² Terry Horgan and John Tienson (2002), Christopher Shields (2011), and Uriah Kriegel (2015) have recently defended the view that attitudes possess a non-sensory attitudinal phenomenology.

proponents of such arguments only to the conclusion that non-sensory phenomenology exists. In other words, these arguments fail to get one to the conclusion that it is the attitude *itself* that possesses phenomenology as opposed to some non-attitudinal state associated with that attitude. As I contend, in order for these arguments to successfully arrive at the conclusion that NSAP exists, a position about the nature of attitudes must first be ruled out—namely a specific version of a view known as role functionalism. Role functionalists hold that attitudes are second-order properties of having some first-order property that plays a causal role. With respect to the popular arguments offered by proponents of NSAP, role functionalists can claim that (a) what possesses the phenomenology are first-order non-attitudinal properties, not second-order attitudinal properties, and (b) these latter properties that are the attitudes themselves lack phenomenology. In order to defend NSAP, then, we need an argument that eliminates this role functionalist position.

In part 3 of the paper, I seek to offer such an argument. That argument relies on embracing a view that stands in marked contrast to role functionalism—viz. realizer functionalism. Realizer functionalists hold that attitudes are not second-order role properties but rather first-order realizer properties that play a particular causal role. I embrace this view of the nature of attitudes, and in turn argue that states that realize the causal role of desire possess non-sensory phenomenology. If I am correct about this, the above line of reasoning serves to vindicate the existence of NSAP. The argument I offer in defense of NSAP, however, is only as plausible as the realizer functionalist position that undergirds it.

In part 4 of the paper, then, I proceed to explain why we should be realizer functionalists, and in particular why we should be realizer functionalists as opposed to role functionalists. I do so by discussing the major reason role functionalism is embraced over realizer functionalism, and in turn argue that such a reason is not a compelling one. I proceed to argue that if one denies the realizer functionalist position I embrace, then one should abandon the view that NSAP exists. This is because, as I contend, realizer functionalism and role functionalism are the two most plausible views concerning the nature of attitudes. And insofar as role functionalism is true, attitudes lack phenomenology.

I conclude by discussing why it matters whether attitudes possess phenomenology. My contention will be that insofar as NSAP exists, particularly in the case of desires, this enables us to explain how we possess epistemically secure access to our desires, and how desires can provide (normative) reasons for action.

I: Non-Sensory Attitudinal Phenomenology Defined

Before proceeding further, it will help to get a clearer understanding of what NSAP is. By *non-sensory phenomenology*, I mean phenomenology that is not identical with or reducible to any of the following types of experiences:

- (a) perceptual experiences (e.g. olfactory experiences)
- (b) the experiences of bodily sensations (e.g. the experience of hunger pangs)
- (c) the experiences of imagistic imagery of a non-linguistic sort (e.g. the experience of thinking of one's distant friend)

(d) the experiences of linguistic imagery (e.g. the experience of thinking 'I'm tired' in words)

Non-sensory phenomenology, then, is phenomenology not encompassed by (a)-(d).³ I understand *non-sensory phenomenology* this way in large part because a number of those who deny the existence of NSAP, philosophers I will call *NSAP conservatives*, are sympathetic with this construal of it.⁴

By *attitudinal phenomenology*, I mean phenomenology that at the very least is *possessed* by the attitude in question. To say that a token attitude A *possesses* phenomenology of type P is to say that A instantiates P. Any proponent of the existence of NSAP, philosophers I will refer to as *NSAP liberals*, who embraces *attitudinal phenomenology* must at least accept the view that it is the attitudes themselves that instantiate certain phenomenal properties. Consider: if a particular phenomenology were merely *associated* with an attitude, as opposed to being possessed by it, then it would not, strictly speaking, be the attitude that instantiated the phenomenology but the state associated with it that did. Such *associated* phenomenology, I take it, would not be deserving of the name *attitudinal phenomenology*.⁵

Now most NSAP liberals hold that the relationship between phenomenology and the attitude that has it, is stronger than one of mere possession. The majority of these

³ Non-sensory phenomenology also sometimes goes by the name “cognitive phenomenology.” In this paper, I will use the two phrases to mean the same thing.

⁴ Tye and Wright (2011)—from which the above quartet is largely adapted—are two such conservatives. Prinz (2011) is another conservative who embraces this characterization of non-sensory phenomenology.

⁵ It bears mentioning here that one can embrace this explanation of what it means to say an attitude possesses phenomenology, while also embracing the view that the phenomenology of the attitude in question changes its felt quality over time. This is because even if the phenomenal character of a state changes over time, we still need an explanation of what it is for that state to possess phenomenology at a given point in time. And the above gloss of *possession* provides such an explanation.

liberals appear to embrace the view that at the very least the phenomenology that certain attitudes (allegedly) possess *suffices* for making those attitudes the type of attitudes they are.⁶ Most of these philosophers also hold that certain attitude types like desire have a characteristic, distinctive phenomenology that is associated with *only* attitudes of that type. To use David Pitt's (2004) term, these theorists think certain attitudes have a *proprietary phenomenology*, which individuates attitude types and enables us to type-identify attitudes on the basis of their phenomenology.⁷ As I have construed things, though, one need not hold this stronger view in order to embrace NSAP liberalism.⁸

NSAP liberals have offered a number of arguments in defense of the existence of non-sensory/cognitive phenomenology. At least some of these philosophers believe that the arguments they offer in defense of the existence of the latter also enables them to arrive at the conclusion that non-sensory *attitudinal* phenomenology exists.⁹ But, with respect to two of the more popular defenses of cognitive phenomenology, we will see that this is in fact not the case. Explaining why these arguments do not get the NSAP liberal to the conclusion that NSAP exists will also help illuminate what needs to be done in order to put non-sensory attitudinal phenomenology on firm ground.

II: How *Not* to Defend Non-Sensory Attitudinal Phenomenology

⁶ Horgan and Tienson (2002) hold this stronger view. Christopher Shields (2011) and Kriegel (2015) appear to think the same.

⁷ I am sympathetic with the view that certain attitudes possess phenomenology that not only suffices for making the attitude in question the attitude type it is, but is also proprietary in nature. I will not, however, defend these stronger claims here.

⁸ Note that as I have characterized things, it is possible to be an NSAP *conservative* and embrace the view that attitudinal phenomenology exists. One can do so if one thinks the phenomenology certain attitudes possess is a type of experiential property encompassed by (a)-(d).

⁹ Horgan (2011), for instance, thinks that the arguments he offers in defense of cognitive phenomenology justify the claim that NSAP exists.

The two most common types of arguments NSAP liberals have offered in defense of the existence of cognitive phenomenology—types of arguments they appear to think allow them to arrive at the conclusion that certain attitudes possess non-sensory phenomenology—are (a) contrast arguments and (b) partial-zombie arguments. Neither type of argument, even if sound, gets the liberal to the conclusion that NSAP exists. Consider (a) first. So-called contrast arguments involve the presentation of two scenarios that are thought to be identical in terms of sensory phenomenology, but nevertheless involve a difference in phenomenology. Strawson (1994), for example, has us consider a case in which two subjects allegedly have the same auditory experience of certain sounds, but one subject understands the sounds as words and the other does not. It is then claimed that there is a phenomenological difference between them. Insofar as the sensory experiences of the two persons are identical, so the argument goes, the phenomenological difference must be a matter of non-sensory properties.¹⁰

Conservatives have responded to the above case by contending that the phenomenal difference between the agent with understanding and the agent who lacks it can be accounted for in terms of a difference in sensory phenomenology.¹¹ But setting aside the issue of whether this conservative move is tenable, what has not been made explicit in the literature is that even if the phenomenology in question is non-sensory in nature, such contrast arguments, *on their own*, do not get liberals to the conclusion that the attitudes in question possess phenomenology. To see why, it will be helpful to work with a type of mental state that is more obviously an attitude.

¹⁰ Siewert (1998; p. 275) defends a similar type of contrast case argument.

¹¹ Carruthers (2011), Prinz (2011) and Tye and Wright (2011) offer this response to contrast-style cases.

Christopher Shields (2011) has recently argued that curiosity¹² is a cognitive attitude that possesses phenomenology. Shields could (although he doesn't) attempt to argue for the existence of the NSAP of curiosity by embracing a contrast argument in which we are asked to consider the contrast between two agents—S and R—both of whom are presented with a question only S is curious about. One could then follow Strawson's lead in contending that there is a phenomenal difference between S and R, where this phenomenal difference is not a matter of a difference in sensory phenomenology. But note here that even if there is a non-sensory phenomenal difference between our two agents, this would not *entail* that it is the attitude of curiosity that possesses phenomenology. This is because one can be a role functionalist about this attitude type.

Role functionalists, as noted above, hold that mental states, including attitudes, are second-order states of having a first-order state that plays the causal role of the attitude in question. The first-order state, according to the role functionalist, need not be (and in many cases will not be) an attitude proper. So while a role functionalist can accept that there is a phenomenal difference between the two cases, the phenomenal difference, it can be contended, is a matter of S tokening a realizer state that plays the causal role of curiosity; it is not a difference in phenomenology at the second-order level. S's realizer state, it can then be contended, is not an attitude proper, but rather that which *realizes* or *fills* the causal role of an attitude type. Given this, a role functionalist can embrace the view that curiosity itself (i.e. the second-order property) is not a phenomenal state. Hence, contrast arguments with respect to attitudes like curiosity do not get one to the conclusion that it is the attitude itself that instantiates a non-sensory phenomenal

¹² By *curiosity*, here, I mean *the state of being curious*.

property. In order to arrive at that conclusion, one would need to resist the above role functionalist move by either defending the view that: (i) role functionalism about the attitudes is false, or (ii) if role functionalism is true, second-order role states that are the attitudes are states that possess phenomenology.¹³ Neither (i) nor (ii) is easy to defend.¹⁴ The point, then, is that contrast arguments fail, on their own, to enable NSAP liberals to defend their view. More work needs to be done.¹⁵

Consider (b) next. Partial-zombie arguments involve the claim that there are (metaphysically) possible beings that lack sensory phenomenology and yet still possess a phenomenal life. The possibility of such beings, it is claimed, is supposed to provide us with (at least) a defeasible reason to think there must be some states—typically attitudes—that possess non-sensory phenomenology. Kriegel (2015) offers an example of such an argument. He has us imagine a creature, Zoe, who lacks sensory experiences, but who nevertheless has certain phenomenological experiences such as those involved in realizing the truth of mathematical facts. Kriegel thinks that since Zoe lacks all sensory phenomenology, the phenomenal experiences she tokens must be non-sensory in nature. Horgan (2011) offers a similar type of argument with respect to different cognitive and conative states—e.g., certain types of beliefs and desires. He takes the conclusion of his

¹³ As opposed to the realizer states being the only states that possess phenomenology.

¹⁴ As I will discuss below, I think (i) can be defended. However, defending this claim will take some work. I will argue that (ii), on the other hand, cannot be reasonably defended. But I won't defend that claim in this section.

¹⁵ It might be objected that contrast arguments were never intended to get liberals to the conclusion that NSAP exists. But if *understanding* and states like it are cognitive attitudes, then this objection, I think, misses its mark. Proponents of these arguments such as Strawson (1994) and Siewert (2005) do take these arguments to enable them to arrive at the conclusion that such states possess non-sensory phenomenology. But even if the types of states referenced in these arguments are not attitudes proper, the important thing to note is that contrast arguments do not suffice for getting the NSAP liberal to the conclusion that NSAP exists. At the very least then, certain arguments NSAP liberals have offered in defense of the non-sensory phenomenology non-attitudinal cognitive states are thought to possess, cannot be adopted for more commonplace attitudes.

discussion of partial-zombies to be that these attitudes instantiate non-sensory phenomenal properties.

As with contrast cases, conservatives have ways they can push back against partial-zombie arguments.¹⁶ But even if these arguments provide liberals with a defeasible reason to think non-sensory phenomenology exists, they do not permit us to conclude that NSAP exists. This is because a conservative might hold that the phenomenal states that Zoe allegedly tokens are realizers of second-order states, where these realizers are not attitudes proper. They might further contend that the second-order role states lack phenomenology. The NSAP liberal would thus need an additional argument to arrive at the conclusion that the particular states that possess phenomenology in partial-zombie cases are in fact attitudes.

The point I am making here mirrors the point I made above concerning contrast arguments. The role functionalist can accept that in partial-zombie cases there is a phenomenal difference of a non-sensory nature, but deny that this phenomenal difference indicates that it is the attitudes themselves that *possess* phenomenology. The upshot, then, is that partial-zombie arguments at best get the liberal only to the conclusion that we have a defeasible reason to think that some sort of non-sensory phenomenology exists. Similar points, I think, can be made about other liberal defenses of NSAP.¹⁷

¹⁶ A conservative could, for instance, argue that our phenomenal lives would mirror Zoe's phenomenal life if we too lacked sensory phenomenology. The reason, it could be argued, that we don't realize this is because we aren't aware of the various ways our sensory phenomenology actually constitutes the phenomenology Kriegel thinks Zoe lacks.

¹⁷ For example, Shield's (2011) parity-arguments. Briefly put, Shields argues that if one holds that mental states such as sensations are phenomenal states, then one should think that certain attitudes possess non-sensory phenomenology. His strategy is to point out that some features that sensory states possess are also features that cognitive states possess, and that positing NSAP is the only way to explain this similarity. I lack the space here to address Shield's parity-arguments in detail. I do, however, want to note that I think such arguments do not get one to the conclusion that NSAP exists for similar reasons to the ones adduced

What has gone wrong here for the NSAP liberal is that the main arguments they offer involve an implicit transition from the contention that (i) non-sensory phenomenology exists to the claim that (ii) non-sensory *attitudinal* phenomenology exists. But, as I have argued, (i) does not entail (ii). Nor do these types of arguments give us any reason for thinking that insofar as (i) is true, (ii) must be true as well. They fail to do so because contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments do not provide us with good reason for thinking that either: (i) role functionalism about the attitudes is false, or (ii) if role functionalism is true, the second-order role states that are attitudes possess phenomenology.¹⁸ And this is precisely what the liberal needs to defend in order to avoid the role functionalist move I have been discussing.¹⁹ NSAP liberals, then, need a defense of their view that does not focus merely on demonstrating the existence of non-sensory phenomenology, but also gets them to the conclusion that such phenomenology is actually possessed by some attitudes.

At this point it might be noted that there is one broad type of argument in the literature that has been used to defend the view that some cognitive states possess phenomenology—viz. what we might call the *Argument from Epistemic Access* (AEA). In broad form, AEA can be construed as follows:

above with respect to contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments. I also worry that regardless of this problem, Shields arguments will be seen as question-begging by conservatives.

¹⁸ It might be suggested that proponents of contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments have independently motivated views about the nature of attitudes that are being assumed to be true when they offer such arguments. If these independently motivated views are true, then these arguments really would get liberals to the conclusion that NSAP exists. But note that one who offers this suggestion is conceding the main point of this section—viz. that contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments *alone* don't get one to the conclusion that NSAP exists. One must also rely on controversial positions about the nature of attitudes as well. In the next section of the paper I make these controversial positions about the nature of attitudes NSAP liberals need to rely on explicit.

¹⁹ It bears stressing that I have not argued here that role functionalism and the existence of NSAP are incompatible. I do, however, defend this incompatibility claim later in the paper.

- (1a) We have a type of epistemic access E to some cognitive states C.
- (2a) We couldn't have E to C if C did not possess phenomenal features F.
- (3a) Therefore, C possesses phenomenal features F.

E, C, and F will be filled-in in different ways by proponents of this line-of-reasoning. For example, Pitt (2004) argues that we have direct, immediate epistemic access to our thoughts only if such thoughts possess proprietary, distinctive and individuating phenomenology.²⁰ In other words, Pitt holds that we could have this type of epistemic access to our thoughts only if thoughts possess these phenomenal properties. And since we do have such access, it follows that some thoughts possess these properties. Goldman (1993) develops a similar argument with respect to less-controversial attitude types.

If the type of argument Pitt and Goldman defend vis-à-vis the attitudes is sound, it vindicates NSAP liberalism. But, as Bayne and Montague (2011) note, the Argument from Epistemic Access has not found a warm reception. Part of the concern both proponents and opponents of NSAP liberalism have had with this type of argument is that it relies on the controversial contention that the epistemic access in question can be explained only by positing that attitudes possess a certain phenomenology. But a number of philosophers think such epistemic access can be explained in other ways.²¹ In order to defend AEA, then, one would need to argue that all these alternative explanations fail. Additionally, one would have to provide support for the view that we do have the

²⁰ By *distinctive phenomenology*, Pitt means a phenomenal quality that entails that token thoughts are phenomenologically different. By *individuating phenomenology*, Pitt means a phenomenal quality that constitutes a thought's representational content. See his (2004; p. 4-5) for a discussion of *proprietary*, *distinctive*, and *individuating* phenomenology.

²¹ Bonjour (2004), for example, defends the view that we are directly acquainted with conscious attitudes without positing that these attitudes possess phenomenology.

relevant sort of access to cognitive states, a contention that also has its fair share of critics.²² Given the various ways that conservatives can respond to AEA, a liberal who attempts to defend NSAP in this *indirect* manner is, to say the least, going to have to engage in some significant toil.

My own view is that taking this epistemic turn to defend NSAP is strategically problematic for the reasons just given. More importantly, though, I think the above indirect defense of NSAP is unsatisfactory because it avoids directly engaging with the metaphysical issues I take to be at the heart of the debate between NSAP liberals and their opponents. The metaphysical issues in question involve whether we should embrace certain positions in philosophy of mind—namely, views that make it reasonable to think that attitudes, strictly speaking, are phenomenal states. In the next section, I offer a direct defense of NSAP that takes up these metaphysical issues. I do so by looking at a view in the literature on the phenomenology of desire I am largely sympathetic with—namely, Ruth Chang's (2008) position.

III: How to Defend the NSAP of Desires

Chang (2008) has recently contended that some desires have a characteristic type of phenomenology, which she describes as an experienced attraction to the desired object. Acknowledging certain conceptual and linguistic limitations, I think what Chang calls *attraction* can most aptly be characterized as the experience of being *drawn* to the desired object, or experiencing a pull to that which one wants. Other theorists, including NSAP conservatives, acknowledge the existence of such experiences. Tye (2015), for example,

²² See, for example, Carruthers (2010) and Cassam (2014).

contends that there is something it's like to be drawn to an object²³ and that this experience is intimately connected up with desiring.²⁴

I think that attraction is a genuine phenomenon. But I also hold the more controversial view that attraction is a type of non-sensory phenomenology that *some* desires *possess*.²⁵ Given this, I recognize the burden of needing to defend both the claim that (a) attraction is non-sensory in nature as well as the claim that (b) some desires possess phenomenology.²⁶ Contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments, as I noted above, might establish (a). But they do not demonstrate that (b) is true. How should NSAP liberals go about defending (b)? I think we can get a good idea of how to answer this question by returning to a discussion of functionalism vis-à-vis NSAP liberalism.

I argued above that an NSAP conservative can reason as follows: (i) role functionalism is true and hence all attitudes are second-order states, and (ii) these second-order states lack phenomenology. But there is an alternative view, realizer functionalism, that makes it much more plausible to hold that it is the attitudes themselves that possess phenomenology. As noted above, realizer functionalists hold that an attitude is not a second-order state of having a first-order state that realizes a particular causal role C, but rather is the first-order state that realizes C. This position has been championed by D.M.

²³ "Object" here is being used in a neutral way to refer to that which we desire. A number of philosophers of mind think that what we desire is the realization of certain states of affairs; see Smith (1994) for this common view. Recently, however, some have argued that what we desire are, in some cases, concrete particulars; see Montague (2007) for this alternative position. I need not weigh in on this debate here.

²⁴ Tye writes: "Often when we strongly desire something, we experience a feeling of being 'pulled' or 'tugged.'" The type of experience Tye references here, I think, is akin to what Chang calls *attraction*. Tye goes on to suggest that this type of experience is reducible to a set of sensory experiences. I will address this typical conservative move below.

²⁵ I emphasize the word "some" because I do not think that *all* desires possess phenomenology.

²⁶ Chang does not provide a defense of (a) and (b). This is perhaps because her primary concern is not with the NSAP liberal/conservative debate, but with the debate over whether desires can provide reasons for action. As will be noted below, Chang holds, *pace* Scanlon (1998), Raz (2002), and Parfit (2004), that some desires do provide reasons for action.

Armstrong (1968) and David Lewis (1980), among others, in defense of reductive physicalism—the view that types of mental states are reducible to types of brain states.²⁷

Reductive physicalism aside, if one embraces realizer functionalism then insofar as the state which performs the causal role of the attitude in question possesses phenomenology, it would follow that the attitude itself possesses phenomenology. An adequate defense of realizer functionalism, then would not only block the above NSAP conservative move, but it would also open up the possibility that NSAP exists. While I will defend realizer functionalism later, I now want to argue that we have good reason to believe that, in some cases, states that realize the causal role of desiring are states that possess the phenomenology of attraction. In order to defend this contention, I first need to explain what I take to be the causal role of desire.

On the view I am sympathetic with, desires are states that tend to be caused by certain mental states (e.g. perceptual experiences, beliefs, and other desires)²⁸ and in turn tend to generate action. For example, the desire for a glass of Syrah might be caused by the perceptual experience of a bottle of Syrah. Such a desire would in turn tend to cause, when certain conditions obtain,²⁹ one to act in Syrah-seeking ways. The causal role of desire, then, on my view, is action-based. This action-based account of desire, or something very much like it, is arguably the standard view of desire among philosophers of mind. At least since Hume, it has been the default position on desire.³⁰

²⁷ That being said, realizer functionalists like Armstrong and Lewis have typically not been sympathetic with the view that NSAP exists.

²⁸ Admittedly, it is not easy to make more specific what types of perceptual experiences, beliefs, and other desires typically cause desires, although some would be sympathetic with the view that, e.g., the types of beliefs that tend to cause desires are beliefs about the goodness of states of affairs obtaining.

²⁹ Such conditions would include having the appropriate beliefs and lacking stronger conflicting desires.

³⁰ Indeed, Timothy Schroeder (2004), in one of the few recent full-length works on the metaphysics of desire, notes that the view that "desiring is purely a matter of being motivated to attain an end is such a

There are, however, objections that have been leveled against this standard view. A critic could, for instance, argue that the above account of the causal role of desire does not distinguish desire from other types of mental states. It fails to do so, according to the objector, because there are other states that generate action besides desire. I lack the space to countenance all the types of states that might be thought to play the causal role I am claiming desires play. But I do want to go some way towards responding to this worry by considering a popular candidate for a type of mental state that is thought to generate action besides desire—viz. belief, and in particular, belief that one has a particular duty or moral obligation.

G.F. Schueler (1995) among a host of other ethicists, claims that the belief or judgment that one has a particular duty can generate action in the absence of desire. In defense of this claim, Schueler uses the example of being motivated to go to a PTA meeting on a cold winter night because he views it as his duty to attend. Schueler contends that it cannot be a desire that gets him out the door since he does not want to go to the meeting. What moves him in this scenario, is rather, according to Schueler, the judgment that he has a duty to attend.

Schueler's example and others like it, however, can plausibly be explained as a conflict of desires with one stronger desire winning out. Indeed, Schueler can reasonably be thought to want to perform his duty. Wanting to perform his duty, in turn, gets accorded more weight in his decision calculus than wanting to remain inside. This explanation seems preferable to Schueler's explanation, given that it seems reasonable to think that if he did not *desire* to perform his duty, he wouldn't leave the comforts of his

commonplace in many quarters of the philosophy of mind that it is not even defended" (10). Schroeder proceeds to label the motivational approach to desire: "The Standard View of Desire" (11).

home. Schueler-style cases, then, fail to show that beliefs/judgments that one has a particular duty can perform the same causal role as desire.

As I implied above, there are other objections one can offer to action-based accounts of desire. I have responded to a number of these objections elsewhere. To keep my project manageable, I am going to take this intuitively plausible view of desire, or something very similar to it, to be correct.

Insofar as the causal role of desire is action-based, what reason do we have to think that states with attraction generate action? To answer this question, I suggest we first consider a passage from Theodore Dreiser's *Sister Carrie*. In the passage, Dreiser describes his protagonist, Carrie's, numerous desires to own material goods upon visiting a Chicago department store for the first time. Here is Dreiser's memorable description of the event:

Carrie passed along the busy aisles, much affected by the remarkable displays of trinkets, dress goods, stationery, and jewelry. Each separate counter was a show place of dazzling interest and attraction. She could not help feeling the claim of each trinket and valuable upon her personally, and yet she did not stop. There was nothing there... which she did not long to own. The dainty slippers and stockings, the delicately frilled skirts and petticoats, the laces, ribbons, hair-combs, purses, all touched with her individual desire. (77)

Dreiser goes on to speak of Carrie "feeling the drag of desire" (77). I take it that what Dreiser imagines Carrie experiencing here is a paradigmatic example of what Chang and I call *attraction*. Carrie experiences an attraction to the state of affairs in which she owns

these items; she is, in some sense, drawn to the objects of her desire and she is well-aware of this experience.

Let's next change the story slightly and stipulate that Carrie has enough money to purchase the products in question. What explains why she purchases the items? The best explanation, I submit, is that "feeling the drag of desire" does. In other words, attraction motivates action when coupled with the right beliefs. After all, if one is *drawn* to having a certain state of affairs brought about, then *ceteris paribus*,³¹ one will act, it seems, in ways to bring this state of affairs about.

That is to say, in the above case, it's reasonable to hold that states with attraction are performing the causal role of desire. This is because such states are caused by Carrie's perceptual experiences of the items along with, ostensibly, particular beliefs and desires Dreiser's protagonist possesses (e.g. the belief that it would be pleasurable for her to own such items). This attraction in turn moves Carrie to act—more specifically, to purchase the goods in question. It seems, then, that in some cases states that possess attraction realize the causal role of desire. And, if that's the case, then insofar as realizer functionalism is true, some desires possess phenomenology.

Carrie's case, I think, is similar to circumstances many of us have found ourselves in with respect to our own unique desires.³² Examples abound. My friend, Andrew, experiences an attraction to eating a slice of cake that has just been placed in front of him, and he in turn eats that slice. Another friend, Lauren, is attracted to the state of affairs in which she goes for a long run, and she in turn acts to bring that state of affairs about by slipping on her running shoes. In these cases, it is reasonable to think that the best

³¹ This clause is needed because if the agent does not have the appropriate beliefs or has other conflicting stronger desires then the agent will not act in ways to bring about the content of her desire.

³² This example could also be spelled out in the language of states of affairs to make the same point.

explanation for why these agents act the way they do is that attraction moves them to act. In other words, it seems plausible to suggest that agents who experience attraction act to obtain that which they are attracted to *because* attraction motivates these agents to act.

Further support for the claim that attraction generates action can be mustered by pointing out that agents often explain why they do the particular things they do by claiming they are attracted or drawn to particular objects/states of affairs. An agent, for example, might well claim that she purchased a particular car because she was attracted to owning that car. That explanation, it seems, would suffice for why the agent acted the way she did.

The empirical claim that attraction motivates action, a claim I have posited as the best explanation (at least in some cases) for why agents act the way they do, strikes me as quite plausible. And I should stress that in order for the NSAP of desire to be adequately defended it just needs to be the case that there is at least one instance in which a state with attraction motivates action. I think we are on good ground in holding that there are such cases.³³

³³ It might be suggested that in all of the cases mentioned above, states with attraction merely cause us to instantiate other states, and one of these latter states is what motivates the agents in question to act. This is, I acknowledge, a possibility. But note that if the state with attraction and the state that does the motivating are merely contingently related, then it would in principle be possible for agents to go their whole lives experiencing attraction and yet not be moved to act at all. Such agents would experience strong draws to say, satiate specific bodily needs, and yet not be motivated to act to do so. These persons, I submit, would be very strange to us. We would be inclined to look for some explanation that accounts for how they could experience such strong draws and never be moved to act. Now, as I acknowledged above, I cannot rule out the possibility that there could be such agents. But we certainly need a principled reason to think that there is this additional state that is caused by states of attraction. Additionally, it would have to be the case that in order to pose a problem for my defense of the view that non-sensory phenomenology exists with respect to desire, absolutely no state with attraction ever motivates. That would be a startling conclusion to arrive at.

On the other hand, one might think that states with attraction and the additional state that (allegedly) motivates, are necessarily connected in the sense that whenever there is a state with such attraction, such a state necessarily causes a state that generates action. In that case, states with attraction and motivational states could not come apart in the way envisioned above, and whenever one experiences attraction, that causes one to be moved to act. But if that is the case, then it seems like a mere terminological preference to not think of states with attraction as in some sense motivational. Furthermore, as with the claim that states with attraction are contingently related to an additional state that motivates, we

Now conservatives can grant the above line-of-reasoning and still deny the existence of NSAP. They can do so by arguing that the phenomenology of attraction is sensory phenomenology. The NSAP liberal, then, needs an additional defense of the claim that attraction is non-sensory in nature. I noted above that contrast arguments and partial-zombie arguments might provide defeasible reasons for thinking that non-sensory phenomenology exists. The importance of such arguments, I think, is that they dialectically force the conservative into having to account for the phenomenological difference between, e.g. an agent who experiences attraction and an agent who doesn't by appealing to sensory experience. Prinz (2011) and Tye (2015) attempt to do just this. The former claims that desires might be tokened along with emotional-based experiences like anxiety, apprehension, or anticipation.³⁴ He's right. They might be. But a reasonable response to Prinz's suggestion is to point out that attraction can be experienced in the absence of such emotion-based experiences. It seems possible, for instance, to experience the drag of desire without anticipating obtaining the object, perhaps because one does not believe the object can be obtained. Furthermore, it seems possible to experience attraction without feeling any type of anxiety, apprehension, or even delight.³⁵ If attraction can be

would need a principled reason concerning this necessity hypothesis for positing an additional state besides attraction that motivates. It will not surprise the reader that I think such reasons are not likely to be offered. Attraction alone seems sufficient to motivate action.

³⁴ Prinz (2011) claims that, "Cognitive desires may be accompanied by emotions. If I want it to be the case that my candidate wins, I will feel nervous anticipation, and the thought of victory will instill delight, while the thought of defeat will usher in waves of despair. On experiencing any of these fluctuating feelings, I may report that I desire a victory. *There is no one feeling of desire*, but rather a family of anticipatory emotions" (190) [emphasis added]. I take it that Prinz might claim that some of the emotions that compose this family can explain what I am calling attraction.

³⁵ I take it as obvious that we *can* experience the drag of desire without also experiencing dread, anxiety, or apprehension. This also seems possible with respect to delight. Consider an alcoholic who experiences the draw of having a drink but who does not experience anything close to delight at this thought. It is of course possible for a conservative to dig in her heels here and contend that there must be some set of sensory experiences the combination of which feels like what I am calling attraction. But such a move seems like a last resort that only one with die-hard conservative sympathies would find plausible.

experienced without experiencing these emotion-based experiences, then, the former cannot be reduced to the latter.

A more plausible suggestion would be that some desires possess certain sensations such as hunger pangs, which are part of the above quartet of sensory experiences mentioned above. Alvarez (2008) appears to defend the view that *bodily appetites*—i.e., desires we have in virtue of possessing certain bodily needs—possess sensations such as the experience of being hungry. I argue at length elsewhere that we should not embrace this defense of the phenomenology of desires.³⁶ But even granting that Alvarez's view is correct, her position is compatible with some desires—viz., desires that are not bodily appetites—possessing attraction. Alvarez's account, then, does not call into doubt the existence of NSAP.

I have offered, in this section, a defense of the NSAP of desires. That defense can be summarized as follows: (i) desires are the states that realize the causal role of desiring, and (ii) the states that realize the causal role of desiring possess non-sensory phenomenology; (iii) therefore, desires possess non-sensory phenomenology. Such a defense, of course, is only as plausible as the realizer functionalist position that supports it. And I have yet to offer reasons why we should think such a view is true. In the next section, I defend this version of functionalism. I do so by investigating what I take to be the most promising alternative position to this view—viz., role functionalism—and in turn, arguing that the main motivation for embracing it over realizer functionalism is not a compelling one. As importantly, though, I also argue that if one rejects the realizer

³⁶ In particular, I argue that Alvarez's account of desire leads to an awkward, bifurcated view of desires that is best to abandon. On the view of desires I favor, the sensations that Alvarez appears to think partially constitute desires are in fact mere causes of desires. I should mention here that there is a reading of Alvarez in which she is not arguing that desires are partially constituted by sensations, but rather, that these sensations merely accompany them.

functionalist position about attitudes I embrace, one should be an eliminativist about non-sensory attitudinal phenomenology.

IV: Multiple Realizability, Two Versions of Functionalism, & the NSAP of Attitudes

The main reason a number of philosophers opt for role functionalism over realizer functionalism is because the former view, unlike the latter, is thought to be able to account for the multiple realizability of psychological kinds. To say that a psychological kind *M* is multiply realizable is to say that *M* can be instantiated in a number of physically diverse organisms. So, for example, the psychological kind *pain* is thought to be multiply realizable insofar as a wide-range of organisms, from humans to octopuses to newts, can be in pain. If one embraces role functionalism, it seems, one can make sense of the multiple realizability of this psychological kind. After all, if being in pain is being in a second-order state of having a first-order state that plays the causal role of pain, then as long as an organism tokens a type of state that plays the causal role of pain, that organism can be thought to be in pain.

A realizer functionalist, on the other hand, must say, it seems, that the human and the octopus do not token the same psychological kind. This is because what it is to be in pain according to the realizer functionalist, is to be in a first-order state that plays the causal role of the mental state in question. Insofar as humans and octopuses are not in the same first-order state, these organisms cannot be thought to both be in pain. And it seems reasonable to think these two types of organisms won't be in the same first-order state given their physiological/neurological differences. Realizer functionalism it seems, cannot make sense of the multiple realizability of pain. It is this objection more than any

other that has led a number of philosophers to reject realizer functionalism in favor of role functionalism.³⁷

The first thing to note, however, about the multiple realizability objection vis-à-vis the NSAP liberal-conservative debate is that it targets only liberals with reductive physicalist sympathies. The liberal who embraces property dualism, for instance, can accept that the realizers of the causal role of desire are a heterogeneous lot.³⁸ This can include realizers that possess, e.g. attraction, as well as states that lack this type of phenomenology. The property dualist can allow that what realizes the causal role of desire might be a motley mix of states because she is unsympathetic with the mental state-brain state identity thesis that multiple realizability poses a challenge to.³⁹

One might object, however, that there is still a problem for the dualist who defends the existence of NSAP in the way I have suggested—namely that she still needs to provide an account of what unifies the psychological kind in question.⁴⁰ The dualist, though, has a few options available to her with respect to this question. One option is to contend that phenomenology unifies the kind in question. On this view, what makes the set of realizers desires is that they all possess a particular type of phenomenal character—viz. phenomenal attraction. Such a thesis however, is certainly bold.⁴¹ An alternative

³⁷ The same objection applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to attitudes as opposed to sensations. Putnam (1967) was the first to defend a version of the multiple realizability objection. It has since become one of the most widely discussed arguments in philosophy of mind. For a survey of the literature on multiple realizability, see Funkhouser (2006) and Bickle (2013).

³⁸ Property dualism, while certainly not a popular view, has had its share of recent advocates including David Chalmers (1995), Brie Gertler (2004) and Richard Fumerton (2014).

³⁹ Such a dualist, of course, will have to hold that these immaterial states have causal efficacy.

⁴⁰ A number of philosophers have posed a similar question to reductive physicalists who embrace domain-specific or local reductions of psychological states. See Kornblith and Pereboom (1989). I will have more to say about domain-specific reductions below.

⁴¹ Although I imagine some NSAP liberals who are property dualists might be sympathetic with this position. It might be wondered, however, how phenomenology could play this unifying role if there are dispositional and unconscious desires that lack phenomenology. One plausible response to this question is to embrace the view that such non-phenomenal desires are desires in virtue of their relation to

response to the unification challenge is that what unifies the set of realizers is causal role. So while on this view, the set of all desires is a heterogeneous lot, what unifies the lot is the fact that all of them are states that produce action. A dualist can maintain that the causal role of desire is what plays this unifying role without committing herself to role functionalism about the attitudes.⁴² If such a move is tenable, then the dualist has an alternative, non-phenomenologically based response she can offer to the unification question.

Such a response to the multiple realizability objection is not available to the reductive physicalist. And I certainly don't want the way I have defended NSAP to be held hostage to the truth of dualism. So how might a reductive physicalist with NSAP sympathies respond to this objection? I suggest they do so in the same way that a number of reductive physicalists who lack NSAP sympathies have responded to it—viz., by defending domain-specific reductions of psychological kinds.⁴³ On such a view, psychological states are relativized to sets of organisms, viz., organisms with the appropriate neurological kinds. Lewis's (1980) species-relative reductionist program provides one model for how such reductions can be carried out. Here is an example: perhaps a certain neuronal kind realizes a particular type of desire in humans (e.g. D-excitation), while a different type of neuronal kind realizes desires in octopuses (e.g. OD-excitation). If that's the case, then qua realizer functionalists, we can posit D-excitation as a desire-that- Φ for humans, and OD-excitation as a desire-that- Φ for octopuses.

phenomenally conscious desires. This approach to non-phenomenal attitudes is defended by Kriegel (2015) among others.

⁴² This is the case because such a dualist does not hold that desires are second-order properties of having some first-order property that plays the causal role of desire. Kim (1992), qua reductive physicalist, offers a similar response to the question of what unifies the heterogeneous lot of physical realizers of desire. I will have more to say about Kim's defense of reductive physicalism below.

⁴³ Armstrong (1968; *passim*), Lewis (1980), Kim (1993), Polger (2002) and a host of others have defended reductive physicalism in such a manner.

Relativizing mental kinds to species might be problematic insofar as there can perhaps be a heterogeneous lot of intra-species neural states that play the causal role of a single psychological state. But if there is such a problem, as Horgan (1993) and others have held, it can potentially be handled by relativizing the latter to more specific sets of organisms.

The above response to multiple realizability concerns will likely not appease the committed role functionalist. The latter will object that it has the consequence that humans and octopuses cannot token the same psychological kind, say desire, since desires for humans are of a different kind than desires for octopuses. I think, though, that this consequence role functionalists find so objectionable is not all that problematic when we investigate the matter more carefully. Indeed, insofar as the cognitive/neural architecture of these two species is in fact remarkably different, it seems reasonable to hold that human desire and octopus desire really are two different psychological kinds. The reason, I submit, that we might think this is not the case is because the causal role these states play for both species is the same. But when one takes into account the radically different nature of what is playing the causal role of these states, the above objection loses much of its force. In short, then, I deny that the type of multiple realizability role functionalists think we need to make sense of is a phenomenon that needs to be made sense of; or, more carefully, needs to be made sense of in the way that the role functionalist thinks it does.⁴⁴ So, there are, I think, reasonable responses the physicalist can make to multiple realizability concerns.

I have attempted to undercut the primary reason for being a role functionalist by arguing that multiple realizability concerns do not tip the scale in favor of role

⁴⁴ See Polger (2002) for a similar, more developed response to this worry.

functionalism over realizer functionalism. My own view is that role functionalists would prefer to be realizer functionalists if not for multiple realizability issues. The reason is that there are advantages to being a realizer functionalist as opposed to being a role functionalist. For example, realizer functionalists appear to have a much easier time accounting for the causal efficacy of mental states. Kim (2006), McLaughlin (2006) and others have argued that the second-order properties role functionalists posit as mental states have no role to play in causal explanations. So, for instance, it has been argued that one can provide an entirely sufficient causal explanation of why an agent grimaces when she stubs her toe by simply positing the realizer state. There is no explanatory need to posit an additional second-order state because there is simply no causal work for this second-order property to do. And it does seem reasonable to think that what is doing the causal work here is not the second-order state of having a property that plays the particular causal role of pain, but rather that which realizes this causal role. Exclusion arguments like these, if sound, would indicate that the role functionalist is committed to radical epiphenomenalism. Insofar as radical epiphenomenalism is false, this would constitute a *reductio* of role functionalism. Although there are responses in the literature to this objection, the realizer functionalist appears, at the very least, to be on firmer ground with respect to the causal efficacy of mental states than the role functionalist.

If the primary reason for being a role functionalist is not compelling, and there are advantages to embracing realizer functionalism over role functionalism, then that provides support for embracing the former over the latter.

Much more, of course, could be said about the debate between role and realizer functionalists than I have said here. But what I want to argue now is that, if one rejects

the realizer functionalist position I embrace, one should also deny that NSAP exists. I think this is the case because I hold that: (i) the most plausible view of the attitudes is either role or realizer functionalism and (ii) NSAP does not exist if role functionalism is true. Concerning the first contention, I hold that, conceptually-speaking, attitudes, unlike sensations, are *not* to be understood in terms of their phenomenology. Consider: if it were in fact the case that states that generate action lack phenomenology, it would still be reasonable to think of these states as desires.⁴⁵ This indicates, I think, that *desire* is a functional concept. And given this, I contend that the two best options we have concerning the ontological nature of these states are role and realizer functionalism.

Next, consider that it's plausible to think that if role functionalism about the attitudes is true, then attitudes lack phenomenology. In defense of this claim, one can do worse than offer the following phenomenological appeal: there is nothing, it seems, it feels like to token a second-order property of having some property that plays a certain causal role. If anything has a felt quality, it would seem to be the first-order state that actually moves us to act. Admittedly, such phenomenological appeals have their dialectical limitations. But in this context, such an appeal, I think, is not out of place. After all, where else should we start in investigating whether a given property has a felt quality than with examining our own phenomenal life?

In addition to the above phenomenological appeal, there is further reason to think that the states role functionalists believe are attitudes lack phenomenology. I call it the "Argument from Strangeness." This argument relies on the claim that the second-order properties the role functionalist thinks are attitudes are strange properties. Anyone who

⁴⁵ I do not, however, think the same can be said about sensations. But I do not need to defend that claim here.

has tried to convince the folk that such properties exist would, I think, agree. The next step in the argument is that it seems reasonable to think that these properties would be less strange to us if they possessed a felt quality. This is because we would ostensibly have a more intimate relationship to these properties by way of their phenomenology than we appear to have.

In defense of the Argument from Strangeness, consider the following: it is not hard to convince the folk that there are first-order mental properties such as being in pain. It is, however, much more difficult to convince them that they possess second-order mental properties of having some first-order mental property. And one reason for this, it could reasonably be suggested, is because such second-order mental properties are not properties they are already aware of/familiar with via what these properties feel like. This line-of-reasoning is why, I think, Argument from Strangeness has some force.⁴⁶

A role functionalist might object at this point that while it might seem strange to think second-order properties possess phenomenology, it is not an implausible position to hold. After all, realized things often inherit the properties of their realizer. For instance, a corkscrew might be realized by a piece of metal, and thereby inherit the metal's properties (e.g. its shininess, conductivity, etc.).⁴⁷ So, it might be suggested, a similar type of inheritance occurs in the case of second and first-order mental properties.

In response to this proposal, it bears pointing out that this sort of example is not analogous to the case of first and second-order mental properties. In the case of the corkscrew and the piece of metal that realizes it, we have, it could reasonably be

⁴⁶ Note that while I pointed out earlier that some philosophers think that we have direct awareness of our attitudes, the philosophers in question would not hold, I think, that we had such direct awareness if attitudes were the type of second-order properties the role functionalist thinks are attitudes.

⁴⁷ I thank Andrew Melnyk for raising this objection.

suggested, two overlapping objects that could easily be mistaken for one and the same object. In fact, some mereologists might contend that we have one and the same object here. This is not, I take it, similar to the case of second-order and first-order *mental properties* of the stripe under discussion. For starters, these properties are just that—they are properties not objects, let alone, overlapping objects. And role functionalists are not going to claim that the second-order property just is the first-order property. Furthermore, these are not the types of properties, it seems, we would readily mistake as one and the same property. So while I think there are cases in which a realized object does inherit the properties of a realizer object, these examples don't provide us with a good reason to think that such inheritance occurs in the case of second- and first-order properties.⁴⁸

Given the intuitive plausibility of the above phenomenological appeal, the Argument from Strangeness, and the fact that it seems reasonable to hold that the second-order properties thought to be attitudes by the role functionalist fail to inherit the phenomenology of the first-order realizer properties, it is plausible to maintain that these second-order properties lack phenomenology.⁴⁹

To summarize: given that attitudes are functional concepts, it seems reasonable to think we should be either role or realizer functionalists. Role functionalism leads to the conclusion that NSAP does not exist. Realizer functionalism, as I have argued, does not. Therefore, we have good reason to believe that, if NSAP exists, it is because some version of realizer functionalism is true.

⁴⁸ There are certainly many cases in which realized properties fail to inherit the property of their realizers. To take but one example, the property of costing \$5 does not inherit the properties of the things that realize that property. The property of costing \$5, for instance, does not inherit the bitterness of the pint of beer that realizes that property. So one might reasonably ask why we should think such inheritance takes place in the case of the type of second-order and first-order properties the role functionalist invokes.

⁴⁹ It bears mentioning here that if role properties really do inherit the phenomenology of their first-order realizer states, *pace* what I have just argued, and one also accepts my contention that first-order realizer states possess non-sensory phenomenology, then one should be committed to the view that NSAP exists.

Conclusion: The Significance of Defending the NSAP of Desires:

It might be wondered why it matters whether some attitudes possess phenomenology beyond, perhaps, enabling philosophers of mind to provide a correct account of the nature of these types of states. In this concluding section I want to argue that the existence of NSAP impacts areas beyond philosophy of mind. In particular, the existence of such phenomenology has significance with respect to issues concerning the epistemology of attitudes as well as rational agency.

Concerning the former, I noted above that some liberals have offered epistemic arguments to the conclusion that NSAP exists. I resisted this epistemic turn because I think such claims are downstream to certain fundamental issues in philosophy of mind. But my thinking this is consistent with the claim that, once a liberal has adequately defended the existence of NSAP, it can play an explanatory role in one's theory of self-knowledge. And, on my view, it does. More specifically, I think the most plausible explanation for how we do have epistemically direct,⁵⁰ highly secure knowledge of some of our desires is that we are able to type-identify desires via their attraction. I will not defend this approach to the epistemology of desires here. But insofar as this view is correct, it would explain, in part, why we should care whether desires do possess attraction.

⁵⁰ *Direct*, here, means *non-inferential*.

The view that some attitudes possess non-sensory phenomenology also bears on issues concerning practical agency. As noted above, Chang (2008) argues that some desires provide (normative) reasons for action *in virtue* of desires possessing attraction. This strikes me as quite plausible. After all, if I am offered the choice between an eggplant soufflé and a cheeseburger, the fact that I am attracted to the former and not the latter would appear to provide me with a *defeasible* reason to opt for the soufflé and not the cheeseburger. Less trivially, the fact that I am attracted to a career in academia as opposed to a career in finance provides me with a defeasible reason to pursue the former and not the latter.⁵¹

Embracing the view that desires possess attraction, provides support for the commonsensical view that wanting Φ can provide us with a normative reason to obtain Φ . Such a conclusion is not to be taken lightly given that a number of rationalists⁵² have recently criticized this standard Humean line. If, however, desires fail to possess phenomenology, and in particular the phenomenology of attraction, then it seems much more reasonable to hold that this attitude cannot provide reasons for action.⁵³ The upshot, then, is that whether desires possess phenomenology has a crucial bearing on this Humean/Anti-Humean debate.

⁵¹ I stress the defeasible nature of such a reason. It is certainly possible that there are other reasons that make it the case that, all things considered, I should not act on this particular desire.

⁵² See, e.g., Scanlon (1998), Raz (2001), and Parfit (2002).

⁵³ Indeed, a number of rationalists including Scanlon (1998), Raz (2002) and Parfit (2001) embrace non-phenomenological views of desire and then proceed to argue that given what desires are, these states cannot provide reasons for action. For example, we find Scanlon (1998) arguing that desires (or at least the most significant type of desires) are inclinations to have one's attention directed to reasons that count in favor of the desired object. He then goes on to argue that having one's attention directed in such a way does not provide normative reasons to act; it is rather the reasons one directs one's attention to that provide such normative support. But as Chang contends, if certain desires are instead attractions to objects, then regardless of whether one has the inclination to think about the reasons for having such objects, it is not difficult to see how being attracted to Φ can provide a reason to acquire Φ . Adopting such an attitude towards an object appears to be a perfectly viable candidate for rationalizing one's action.

I want to close by stressing that while I have focused here almost entirely on the nature of desires, the way I have defended the NSAP of desire also serves, I believe, as a template for how to defend the NSAP of other attitudes. And insofar as these additional attitude types do possess phenomenology, the impact this could have on areas beyond philosophy of mind, I imagine, might be just as significant. Future work, I believe, will demonstrate that this is in fact the case.

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